Introduction
This paper is an attempt to integrate, \'lithin thc~ S&:::c simple construct, several well-known economic paradigms and to identify their key distinguishing features on. the basis of c1if-ferent exogeneity-endogcneity assumptions, derived from different market equilibrium or market structure hypotheses • . The spirit of the paper follows to some extent Narglin's (19B1) recent contributionto the comparison of neoclassical, neo-Marxian and nco-~cy-nesian gro\'lth paradigms, but the framevlork of analysis is the fix-price quantity constrained model of Benassy, Nalinvaud and 1/ orh0rs-. extended to include a market for capital services.
:
By doing so, the paper gives a more integrated and also broader vie\v of possible equilibria and types of behavior than the one found in Marylin. In particular, it links short run Keynesian theory with longer run paradigms and gives an account of the old Keynesian idea of flanimnl spirits" \'lhich is more in line uith the fix-price quantity constrained literature. It also establishes an interesting duality bct\o.Jeen Kalecki's concept of "degree of competition t' and the degree of disequilibririm in a perfectly competitive goods market. Finally, by' emphasizing the linkages bctuccn Recent comprehensive surveys of the fix-price literature can be found in Drazen (1981) and Benassy (1982a) . ") J .
income distri.bution, imperfect competition, effective demand and prj.ce and Huge rigidi tics, it throHs a different and more intense 1igh t on the undcr1y ing forces \vhich may determine the equilibrium and dynamics of a capitalist economy.
The model to be used is presented first. A taxonomy of possible equilibria and adjustment processes is given next. Aspects of income distribution and political economy are examined at the end.
II)
The -1-1odel 
The other class is composed of firm Ov-lners \-,ho have exclusive access to the means of production and derive their income from interest on rented capital and from any excess profits firms 2/ may have-. I f 1 is a ITl<1rk-up factor on costs of production iJ.nd Y is output, firm owners' income is:
Both classes have simi lar consumption dc~:~ands, namc~ly:
where initial (Hi) and final (M i ) money holdings must satisfy their budget constrZlints!
The interest rate is al\'lu.ys assumed tq clear the ll2r1:ct: 
If Y is the sales constr2int faced by firms, profit m2xinlizntion
in a fully cOl":1peti tiV8 ~;c;tting way be \-iY i ttc:n as:
where T is the shadow price associated with the sillcs constrnint.
Using Euler's theorem, these two conditions lead to:
il The assurapti.on of !)riC0 ti. It can readily be seen thZlt T is a mark-up factor so that an in-" teresting duality emerges between the degrees of imperfect compctition and of disequilibrium in a perfectly competitive frnmevork.
Perfectly competitive sales-constrained firms are bound to end up, in the absence of price adjustments, with positive mark-ups over costs.
rrhis is equivalent to having prices determined on the basis of an exogenously given mark-up, which is what the imperfectly competitive firm would do.
The basic frameHork of the model is completed \'lith the following equilibrium conditions:
is government spending ..
III) A taxonomy of possible equilibria
Setting aside equation (9) which simply defines the aggregate stock of -capital, the production function (5), the first order conditions (6) and (7) I and the good market equilibrium condition {IO} form a system of 4 equations in 6 unknowns: two quantities (Y and L), two prices (wand p) and two rates (r and T);
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t\'IO of thc~;6 six variz;blcs must therefore he specified c:~oqcnol\!>-ly in o!'dcr to close! the model. As vlill nO~'i be ~ccn'l diff!_:r('Il~:
types of cconcElic bclh1vio1.-and p2radi(J!T!~-; can be: os~;ociatcd \7i_ ~~h different choices for these two pte-set vnrinblcs.
A useful graphical analysis can be achieved by noting first that, because of the homogeneity postulate, t:110 c2pi.tzllj labour ratio CGn bo eliminated from (6) and (7) to give a f2ffiily of factor price frontier curves represented in Figure 1 as n set of dO~jn\'lard sloping curves in the space (H, r). '1'he one £n1:t11c;1:
to the right corresponds to the purely competitive unconstr~in2d case (T =: 0); ~_/ these curves shift in\-Jards as T rises due to risin~ d0greGS of imperfect competition or market disequilibrium.
On the other hand, the elimination of 1" bet\"Iecn (oJ and (7) qivc!:"i the capital/labour ratio as a direct function of the wagc/rcnt~l ratio. The iso-employment or iso-output loci associated with the given amount of capital can therefore be represented as straight lines passing through the origin and rotating counter-clockwise os employment and output fall. 1~e region of excess supply for both goods and 12bour 5.s limi ted, in Fj.gure 1, to the area above the r full-emplo~~nent locus {y = y 1 ilnd below the unrestricted factor price frontier.
The typology of possible equilibria can nOH be easily visualized.
Point C, at the intersection of the full employment schedule and the unrestricted factor price frontier, is the nco-?./ The shadow price associated with the sales constrnint clcnrly vanishes when the latter is no longer binding. 
,.
A similar pattern emerges when nominal wages are exogen~ ously given Cw-: ~), and are set at a level which is too high to clear the labour market at the price p which clears the gocx1s market in a perfectly competitive environment (T = 0). This is an equilibrium (K in Figure 1 ) which is perhaps the closest in spirit to Keynes' own formulation.
Suppose, on the other hand, that theexpcctcrl sales constraint is exogenously given, at a level y = Y < yF, by a prevailing state of "animal spirits". Suppose also that prices still adjust to clear the goods market at 'i, so that the economy still ends up on the unconstrained factor/price frontier (T = 0). We now find a Keynesian type of equilibrium \,;hich is closer in spirit to neo-Keynesian gra:lth theory ~ la Kaidor or ~ la Robinson; let KR.be this equilibrium in Figure 1 . Here, the real wage can adjust to ensure that firms stay In the second case, the real wage can still" be defined ex ante as a target real \'Jage vlhich may 'be forced, ex lx>st to adjust, through an endogenously determined rate of inflation. Because of this close association bet\·reen imperfect competition, income distribution and economic activity, these models (SK and SK' in Figure 1) Take for example the case of an exogenous real "lage and a given state of animal spirits. This woulJ require prices to be flexible ~nough to adjust the dem.:lnd for goods to a level compatible with Y, but not enough to clear the goods market. This clearly does not ~ake much economic sense.
Notice that the profit-interest conflict can be seen as a combinnation of the M~rxian class struggle and the Raleckian state of monopoly concept, since a mov~ment along a line of constant real wages can be decomposed into a vertical movement along an iso-interest line and a,movemcnt along nn iso-profit line (see Figure   1) •
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f that their iso-income contours (the I curves on Figure 2 ) arc upward sloping and intersect the iso-employment loci from above. The \..f shupe of workers' iso-income contours (the I') depends on the elilsticity of sUbstitution between capital and labour. High elasticities (bet\'leen one and plus infinity) imply that vlorkers mClximize their income (taken as a whole) at the classical eqUilibrium, and that. their i~30-income contours are dO\'ln\,;ard sloping and intersect the iso-profit loci from below. For lower elasticities of substitution, the point of maximum income may eventually move up;'lurds on the unconstrained factor price frontier if capital is relatively more scarce than labour" In this case, the iso-income contours, while still downward-sloping, will now intersect the iso-profit lines twice (see Figure 3 ).
In the case of high elasticities of substitution it is easy to see that the set of Pareto optima (the contract curve) is the segment"OC of the full-employment locus (see Figure 2 ). Marxian class struggle, on an iso-profit line, is then hard to justify, since it \<lould be advantageous for -both classes to move dOt-In the iso-profit schedule towards full-employment. The pure Ka~eckian conflict betitlccn vlagcs and profits clearly makes more sense since a fall in wages and a rise in profits, with a constant interest rate, makes "lorkers ,",vorse off and firm o\,;ners better off. Notice however that if the economy is off the contract curve (for example at Hi) a pure I<aleckian move, down to H 2 , may be less likely to occur than a mixed move with a rising interest rate to some point between C and II3 on the full-employment locus, \'lhich makes everyone better off. In the case of low elasticities of substituti.on, the set of Pareto optima may now be extended to include, besides the fullemployment locus, the segment of unconstrained factor price frontier between the classical equilibrium and workers under-employment * optimum H (see Figure 3) . On that segment, Marxian class struggle becomes relevant. In addition, it is particularly intcr--esting to notice that the set~of stable (in the ~cnse,of being on and the factor price frontier is:
Consider fi~sLfirmownersf illcome.
(A-I) ; and from (A-3):
This maximum will be below full-employment if the wages rental ratio is higher at that point than at full-employment. Hence, with (A-6): ratio at full-cmployrnc:nt is not teo large.
